Record No. 1831-93-1Court of Appeals of Virginia. Argued at Norfolk, Virginia.
Decided: April 11, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Frederick B. Lowe, Judge
Mary Keating (Shuttleworth, Ruloff, Giordano Kahle, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Morris H. Fine (John R. Lomax; Fine, Fine, Legum Fine, P.A., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Bray
MEMORANDUM OPINION[*]
JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY.
Charles E. Hill (husband) and Pearl Hill (wife) were divorced by decree of the trial court which ordered, inter alia, that wife “shall be granted 50% of [husband’s] IRA accounts, . . . the same to be paid to [wife], if, as, and when [husband] receives the same.” Husband subsequently either “closed” or withdrew funds from these accounts, transferring the deposits to new IRA accounts at different financial institutions.[1] As a result, the trial court concluded that husband had “received” the funds as contemplated by the decree and ordered the accounts “equally divided between the parties” in accordance with its provisions. Husband appeals, complaining that the order modified the decree in violation of Rule 1:1. We disagree and affirm the order.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and a recitation of the facts is unnecessary to this memorandum opinion.
“Upon familiar principles, we review the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to wife, the party prevailing below.” Cook v. Cook, 18 Va. App. 726, 731, 446 S.E.2d 894, 896
(1994). “[T]he chancellor is necessarily vested with broad discretion in the discharge of the duties [Code Sec. 20-107.3] imposes upon him,” Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 244, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1987) (citation omitted), and his judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Keyser v. Keyser, 7 Va. App. 405, 409, 374 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1988); see Banagan v. Banagan, 17 Va. App. 321, 326, 437 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1993).
The final divorce decree awarded wife “50% of [husband’s] IRA accounts, . . . the same to be paid to [wife], if, as, and when [husband] receives the same.” To protect the integrity of the accounts and assure rightful distribution to wife, the decree further provided that “a copy . . . be served” on the named depositories and a “notation [be] made . . . on their accounts relative to the order.” When husband thereafter assumed control of the subject accounts by removing and transferring deposits, he “received” the funds within the intendment of the decree and the court properly acted to “enforce what [it] felt to be the tenor and spirit of the . . . decree.” This intervention by the court in no way modified the terms of its original decree.
Husband’s argument that the court improperly relied o Broom v. Broom, 15 Va. App. 497, 425 S.E.2d 90 (1992), decide after the decree in issue, is also without merit. Although the trial judge made reference to Broom during ore tenus hearings related to this dispute, we do not find that the court’s interpretation and enforcement of the decree was controlled by that decision, despite a result consistent with it.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Affirmed.